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Tiivistelmä  
 
Kyseisen opinnäytetyön tavoitteena oli luoda Virtual Laboratory -ympäristölle 
skenaario, jota voitaisiin käyttää application delivery controller -teknologioiden 
opetuksessa datakeskuskursseilla. Virtual Laboratory mahdollistaa 
tietoverkkoharjoituksien tekemisen virtuaalisesti ilman fyysisiä laitteita. Oli tärkeää 
tehdä harjoitus, jonka avulla käyttäjä tutustuisi skenaarioon ja ADC-laitteisiin. 
 
Työssä keskityttiin F5 BIG-IP Virtual Edition ADC-laitteeseen. Myös palvelimia ja muita 
verkkolaitteita jouduttiin asentamaan ja käyttöönottamaan, jotta toimiva verkko 
saataisiin rakennettua. Iso osa työtä oli ongelmien ratkaiseminen, koska kyseisiä 
laitteita ei ole aiemmin käytetty kyseisessä ympäristössä. Kaikkia ongelmia ei pystytty 
ratkaisemaan, ja joitain toimintoja ei voitu ottaa käyttöön, mutta toimiva skenaario 
saatiin valmiiksi. 
 
Harjoitus tehtiin niin, että sen avulla käyttäjä saa skenaarion otettua käyttöön. Verkon 
asetukset asetetaan ja ADC-laite asennetaan. Kyseiseen laitteeseen asennetaan 
virtuaalinen palvelin HTTP-palvelua varten, jonka avulla suoritetaan kuormanjakoa. 
Palvelua varten ADC-laitteeseen asennetaan kyberhyökkäyksiä heikentäviä 
ominaisuuksia. 
 
Työ oli onnistunut, sillä toimiva skenaario saatiin luotua, vaikka ongelmia sen 
toimintaan saamisessa oli. Joitakin ominaisuuksia jouduttiin jättämään pois, sillä 
kaikkia ongelmia ei pystytty ratkaisemaan. Todennäköisesti jotkin näistä 
ominaisuuksista voidaan saada toimintaan. ADC-laitteissa on vielä paljon 
ominaisuuksia testattavaksi, mutta skenaarion pitäisi toimia hyvänä alustana 
datakeskusopetukseen. 
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Abstract  
 
The goal of this Bachelor’s thesis was to provide a scenario for the Virtual Laboratory en-
vironment to implement application delivery controllers into a data center. Virtual Labora-
tory enables the possibility for training networking in a virtual environment. The scenario 
will be used as a tool for teaching on data center courses, which means that a basic case 
study needed to be provided. The case study introduces the user to the scenario, the 
basic setup and functions of an application delivery controller. 
 
The focus of the thesis was the F5 BIG-IP Virtual Edition application delivery controller. 
Implementation of a working network and creation of server and client machines were 
also done within the project. There was a lot of troubleshooting involved to get everything 
working, and not everything could be solved within this project. However, a working sce-
nario was built with the most important features functional. 
 
A basic case study was created so that the user can get the scenario up and running. The 
case study begins with the configuration of the core network and then introduces the ap-
plication delivery controller. A virtual server for an HTTP service is created where load 
balancing, SSL offloading and some denial of service attack mitigation are configured. 
 
The project was successful as a working scenario was created. Some functions had to be 
left out, because every problem could not be solved. There are more troubleshooting and 
advanced configuration options left to be tested. The scenario should serve as a great 
base to start working on data center courses. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Datacenter hardware is expensive, and buying multiple sets of hardware for 
students to practice on would not be cost-effective. The hardware takes up a 
lot of space and electricity, and a powerful cooling system is necessary to 
keep the devices from overheating. Hardware also gets old and new better 
hardware needs to be bought to keep with the times, and to provide teaching 
with the latest technologies. 
The goal of this project was to provide a scenario for a virtual environment 
called Virtual Laboratory. The scenario would be used to teach the latest ap-
plication delivery controller technologies used in modern data centers. A basic 
case study, which would introduce the user to the scenario and devices in it, 
would also be necessary. By creating a basic case study, the scenario would 
also be tested to be working. This would allow to find any possible problems 
that would arise when a user starts working with it. 
The implementation of Cyberlab, a cyber security laboratory, to the Ky-
menlaakso University of Applied Sciences motivated to start researching run-
ning data center appliances, one of them being application delivery control-
lers, in the Virtual Laboratory environment. The Virtual Laboratory was created 
as a bachelor’s thesis work by Jaakko Nurmi for KyUAS in the spring of 2016. 
It provides an environment where the users can practice configuring network-
ing devices and servers. (Nurmi 2016.) 
The creation of Cyberlab began in the spring of 2014 and most of the ground-
work was done during the following summer (Kettunen 2016). Cyberlab has 
generated a lot of thesis works for the students of KyUAS studying information 
technology. One of the thesis works related to application delivery controllers 
was the implementation of such devices in Cyberlab. The work was done by 
Antti Peltonen in the spring 2016. The students studying information 
technology in KyUAS were involved in the stress and attack testing of the 
devices. (Peltonen 2016.) This generated interest in looking into application 
delivery controllers and was a big motivation for this project. 
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2 VIRTUAL LABORATORY 
The virtual laboratory is a virtual environment in which the user can train and 
experiment networking related case studies. It provides a set of networking 
devices for each student to configure themselves, instead of working in groups 
with a smaller set of devices. Because of the progression of virtualization over 
the years, it has become more cost efficient to use virtual devices to teach 
than to buy a set of real hardware. 
Virtual laboratory uses a virtual machine called NestCore as its base, which 
runs a QEMU/KVM hypervisor. The machine has been designed to run on 
VMware hypervisors although it is possible to run it on other platforms that 
support the same format. The laboratory has a web interface where you can 
see the current topology and edit the device settings. In the interface, the user 
can access devices using Guacamole client-less remote desktop gateway, 
which supports VNC, SSH and telnet. Guacamole uses HTML5 to operate, 
that allows no need for any browser plugins. (Nurmi 2016.) 
 
Figure 1. Virtual laboratory web interface showing the datacenter scenario topology 
 
The web interface, shown in figure 1, is accessed using a web browser and 
navigating to the login page of the virtual laboratory system. User then logs in 
to the system using credentials assigned to them by the network 
administrators, where the system is run. The system uses RADIUS 
authentication, which makes it easy to manage users. Users with more 
permissions, who are usually the teachers and other administrators, have 
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administrative functions in their laboratory. For example, they can access 
other laboratories which they do not own, to assist and check the progress. 
The user reserves a laboratory to work on for a time they specify in the 
reservation process, and select the laboratory that they want to work with. The 
progress made in the laboratory can, however, be saved before the time runs 
out and it can be continued later. After loading the laboratory, a topology 
needs to be loaded from a list on the footer bar of the page, which can be 
seen at the bottom of figure 1. A custom made topology file can also be 
uploaded. The creation of topology files will be specified later. By right clicking 
the devices, it is possible to insert a CD or DVD from a dedicated laboratory 
filesystem server. It is also possible to mount a personal USB memory and 
some other USB devices. 
 
Figure 2. Virtual device manager under the preferences tab 
 
There is a preferences tab, which can be seen in figure 2, where it is possible 
to manage the devices used in the laboratory. It possible to add new devices 
or delete existing ones. The devices can be shut down, powered off or reset. 
Shut down is a clean way to power off the devices, which means that the 
software is shut down in a controlled manner. Powering off a device 
immediately removes the power and shuts the device down, which can lead to 
data loss. It should only be used when the device is frozen and cannot be 
shutdown in a clean fashion. Reset is used when the user wants to reset the 
device back to its original state. It creates the device again using the base 
image removing all existing changes. The base image can be specified from a 
list of devices, which are hosted on the laboratory filesystem server. The 
resources reserved for the devices can be edited, but they do not give the 
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overall laboratory more resources, which needs to be taken into consideration 
when adding more resources. A MAC address base, which is used to 
generate the addresses according to the interface number, can be specified. 
This helps in cases where the devices need to have a static MAC address. 
Network interface drivers and graphics drivers can be specified from a list of 
supported drivers. The access mode can be changed to specify how the 
device is accessed, with the choices of telnet, VNC or XVNC. 
 
Figure 3. Cable tap tool in action performing packet capture 
 
Cable tap is a tool that directs a copy of the traffic from a specific cable to an 
interface on a virtual machine running Wireshark packet analyzer. The traffic 
flow can be analyzed to troubleshoot and study the network performance. The 
cables are chosen from a list that automatically contains all the connected 
cables of the scenario, as seen on figure 3. Monitoring more than one cable at 
a time can cause loops. 
The devices are installed using an installation file that is created on the 
laboratory filesystem server. The installation files use the following syntax: 
 TOPIC [Topic of the scenario] 
DEVICE [Name] [REMOTE/filename] [Memory] [CPUs] [Number 
of interfaces] [Interface driver] [MAC-address base] [Access 
mode] [Graphics driver] [Snapshot mode] 
 TOPIC Datacenter Training Scenario 
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DEVICE ADC1 REMOTE/BIGIP.qcow2 4096 2 8 e1000 
00:34:B2:23:12 Xvnc 5902 vmware-svga 0 
The topologies are created using a topology file. The devices are positioned 
with the topology file using simple syntax: 
 [Type of the device] [Name of the device] [X axis] [Y axis] 
 ROUTER R1 600 270 
ADC ADC1 200 400 hidden 
Basically, the type field tells the laboratory to use a specific icon when render-
ing the topology. The name field is important, because it assigns the icon to a 
device with the same name. The X and Y axis fields are used to position the 
icon on the screen. The last example above shows that devices can be hidden 
by adding ‘hidden’ at the end of the line. 
The cables between the devices are also configured and attached using the 
topology file. The syntax is similar with the positioning of the devices: 
 CABLE [Source device] [int #] [Destination device] [int #] 
CABLE ADC1 1 S1 1 
The source and destination device fields should contain the exact name of the 
device. The cable is attached between these devices by connecting it to avail-
able interfaces. The interfaces are inputted to the interface field using a num-
ber. The interfaces usually start from the number 0, however there may be 
some exceptions. An example of a functional topology can be seen on figure 
1. The cables are rendered based on the connections, but are hidden if either 
of the devices is hidden.  
Text can also be added to the topology file to instruct users. Text uses the fol-
lowing syntax: 
TEXT [X axis] [Y axis] [Font size] [Background color] [Foreground 
color] [Text] 
TEXT 1300 200 16px #ffffff #000000 ADC & BIG-IQ Management 
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The font size is defined in pixels and the colors are defined using hexadeci-
mals. 
 
3 CYBER ATTACKS 
Denial-of-service attacks are an effective way to render a web service unavail-
able. These attacks are usually done by flooding a service with legitimate traf-
fic, but in such a volume that the system does not have enough resources to 
handle all the arriving data. This will leave the service unstable for normal us-
ers. Commands such as ping, which are available on most systems, can be 
used to attack against servers. When executed using a big group of clients, it 
can generate a lot of traffic to exhaust the bandwidth of the server. There are 
also attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the systems such as configuration er-
rors or other exploitable features or bugs. An example of an attack that is not 
trying to exhaust the bandwidth of the server, but is instead trying to exhaust 
the computational resources of the server, is SSL renegotiation attack. (Sha-
karian, Shakarian, Ruef 2013, 12-13.) 
SSL renegotiation attack exploits vulnerability where by default the server al-
lows the client to initiate an infinite number of renegotiations. The attacker initi-
ates a SSL secure connection and renegotiates the handshake until it can ex-
haust the resources of the server. SSL handshake takes 10 times more re-
sources from the server than from the client, which means a client with 
enough processing power could take a small, unprotected server down easily. 
More powerful servers need to be attacked using a botnet to exhaust the com-
putational power of the server. Since only a tenth of the resources are needed 
in comparison with the server, the botnet does not necessarily need to be that 
big. (Holmes 2011.) 
Slowloris attack is another application layer attack. It is a type of slow HTTP 
attack, that works by sending HTTP requests to the web server in a slow fash-
ion. A HTTP header is send to the server just before timeout to keep the con-
nection alive, but the request is never completed. This type of attack creates 
very little traffic and should not be detectable by looking at the bandwidth us-
age. In the end, the server cannot accept more connections and the service 
goes unavailable. (Holmes 2013.) 
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4 APPLICATION DELIVERY CONTROLLERS 
Content delivery networks are used on the Internet to support content delivery 
in a scalable fashion. They are used to cache and optimize traffic flow using 
sophisticated technologies. The traffic is cached near the users to reduce traf-
fic between links. This provides faster download speeds, lower latency and 
high availability. CDNs are often combined with application delivery controllers 
to form application delivery networks. ADCs are used to optimize application 
traffic in and out of data centers. This is done using application acceleration 
technologies and load balancing using layer 4-7 switching capabilities. 
(Boucadair & Jacquenet 2015, 71.) OSI model layers 4-7 consist of transport, 
session, presentation and application layers, while 1-3 are physical, data link 
and network layers (Jönsson & Iveson 2014, 33). Unlike CDNs, which work 
using multiple sites, ADNs are usually operated in a single data center 
(Boucadair & Jacquenet 2015, 71). 
The need for ADCs has arisen due to the rise of new type of networks. The 
need for dynamic workspaces and workers bringing their own devices to work, 
has brought the need for better optimization and security in networks. Work-
places need to ensure that the network has high availability. Networks need to 
function 24 hours a day, so that the workers can work at any time of the day. 
ADCs can help to offer this, by optimizing traffic, load balancing between serv-
ers and offering protection against cyber-attacks. (Citrix 2016.) 
Load balancing is the key part of ADCs as they grew from load balancers to 
serve more advanced functions (Salchow 2012). When using load balancing, 
traffic is balanced between different servers to manage the load on the serv-
ers. If one of the servers goes down, the service will still be available, which 
offers for high availability. Load balancing can also be done to servers that are 
in a different physical location. (Citrix 2016.) This allows for protection against 
physical threats such as fires and natural disasters. 
Round robin is a method of load balancing, that works with a simple tech-
nique. When a client contacts the load balancer, it directs the traffic to the first 
server on the list of servers. When another client contacts the load balancer, it 
is directed to the second server. When every server has been used, the load 
balancer goes back to the first server on the list. This makes round robin one 
of the easiest load balancing methods to implement, but it is not necessarily 
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the best. Unless application level health checking is implemented, the servers 
that are unavailable will still receive connection requests, which could affect 
the quality of service. (KEMP 2016a.) 
Source IP hash load balancing, or other type of session persistence, needs to 
be implemented to ensure that clients stay connected to the server while their 
session is on. When using source IP hash load balancing, a unique hash is 
generated for every client. This is done using the source and destination 
addresses. The hash ties the client to a specific server until the session has 
ended, which ensures that if the client disconnects and needs to reconnect, 
the session will still be available to them. However, when a new session is 
initiated, new hash is generated. (KEMP 2016b.) 
Another important part of ADCs is optimizing application performance. A great 
example is SQL database load balancing which works in a similar way to load 
balancing TCP traffic, but the device uses its knowledge to work with the ap-
plication on the database level. It is also possible to offload tasks that are re-
source intensive for the servers. For example, SSL offloading does this by 
handling certificates, encrypting traffic leaving the servers, and decrypting traf-
fic that is arriving at the servers. (Citrix 2016.) 
Websites are often designed for connections offering high-speed and band-
width, but this can deteriorate the user experience for mobile users (Citrix 
2016). Mobile networks are not as resilient, which can make loading heavy 
pages slow for mobile clients. Application delivery controllers can convert im-
ages into formats that are more efficient, and they can optimize scripts and 
cascading style sheet files by removing unnecessary characters and white 
spaces. This helps to compress the data into a more efficient size. (Citrix 
2016.) Compression techniques of this kind might add latency for users with a 
high-speed connection, because the compression takes time. This means that 
the need for compression should be considered carefully. (Salchow 2012.) 
Protection against cyber threats is a key part of modern networks. Application 
delivery controllers can offer protection against threats coming in many differ-
ent forms. They offer ways to protect against application layer attacks and can 
be used to mask sensitive data. The devices can even offer ways to identify 
new attacks. (F5 2016d.) As the devices are used as the entry points to the 
network, they can be used to authenticate and validate users, which protects 
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the network from intruders. It is also possible to weaken the effects of distrib-
uted denial of service attacks, since the devices can for example limit the in-
bound requests. (Citrix 2016.) 
 
4.1 F5 Networks 
F5 Networks, Inc. is the leading manufacturer of application delivery controller 
hardware and software, with 52 percent revenue share in the market in 2014 
(PRNewswire 2014). They released their first web server load balancer in 
1997 (Jönsson & Iveson 2014, 18). They aim at providing their customers 
software to enhance the delivery of application services in modern networks, 
but also the necessary hardware to process the tasks (F5 2016f). 
 
4.1.1 F5 BIG-IP 
F5 BIG-IP refers to a line of products that use F5’s Traffic Management Oper-
ating System (F5 2016a). The products are available as either F5 branded 
hardware or virtual editions (F5 2016b). Traffic Management Operating 
System is not a standalone operating system, but instead a collection of 
software, which consists of all of the software used in BIG-IP platforms. This 
means that the name TMOS is used for the software suite instead of the 
platform. There is also a separate platform called BIG-IP Virtual Edition, that is 
run on a virtual hypervisor. (Jönsson & Iveson 2014, 23.) Some of the sup-
ported virtual hypervisors are VMware ESXi, Linux KVM and Citrix XenServer 
(F5 2016b). 
The main elements of TMOS are Traffic Management Microkernel, Host 
Management Subsystem, Always On Management, Maintenance Operating 
System and End User Diagnostics. TMM is used to handle all the network 
activities and communication to the switch hardware. HMS is running a 
modified CentOS GNU/Linux system that provides tools and interfaces for 
system management. AOM is present on almost all BIG-IP hardware 
products. It allows for remote power management and access to the HMS 
through a serial console port or SSH through a network management port. 
MOS is run on RAM and used for disk and file system maintenance. It can be 
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accessed through the serial port by interrupting the normal boot sequence and 
entering the TMOS maintenance on GRUB. It can also be accessed with a 
bootable USB drive. EUD is capable of doing hardware tests, and can also be 
accessed through GRUB or USB drive. (Jönsson & Iveson 2014, 23-24.) 
BIG-IP has a lot of different modules which can be activated to enable more 
functions. For example, there is Local Traffic Manager, which provides the 
basic functions to use load balancing, offloading and to achieve high availabil-
ity. It also provides some protection against denial-of-service attacks. (F5 
2016c.) Another example is the Application Security Manager, which provides 
even more in-depth protection against denial-of-service attacks and many 
other types of cyber threats. It protects against session hijacking, SQL injec-
tion and can even protect sensitive data by masking it. (F5 2016d.) There are 
many more modules and the modules have a great number of different func-
tions. The choice of modules depends on what is needed, what the hardware 
can run, and what the license allows to be activated. 
BIG-IP products have their own scripting language which can be used to cre-
ate scripts called iRules. It comes with the local traffic management system 
and can be used to manage network traffic. It makes it possible to customize 
the way the traffic is handled, which makes it a powerful tool in traffic manage-
ment. It uses the industry-standard Tools Command Language syntax as its 
base. (F5 2016e.) 
The configuration and controlling of the devices can be done by using either 
the web interface or the traffic management shell. There is also a ZebOS 
Command Line Interface to configure more advanced routing options (IP 
Infusion Inc 2013). 
 
4.1.2 F5 Virtual Editions & BIG-IQ 
In addition to selling hardware, F5 offers virtual editions on its BIG-IP and BIG-
IQ systems. They are virtual versions of almost the same devices that you 
would get if you bought the hardware. The devices can be run locally on a hy-
pervisor such as VMware ESXi or on a cloud service such as Amazon Web 
Services. (F5 2016i.) 
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BIG-IP Virtual Edition appliances are designed to support the growing cloud 
and software-defined market. The key selling points are that they are easy to 
deploy and migrate, which is great for cloud and software-defined 
environments, since they allow for adaptability and automation. This also 
means that they are easily deployed for existing servers. The virtual editions 
also offer more licensing choices, compared with the hardware, to suite the 
needs of a certain environment. The appliances are usually managed, 
deployed and licensed using BIG-IQ. (F5 2016i.) 
BIG-IQ is a centralized management platform to manage all deployed BIG-IP 
devices. It is often used to license BIG-IP devices and can handle the licens-
ing of up to 5000 devices. (F5 2016g.) It is capable of monitoring BIG-IP de-
vice resource usage, the status of high availability and SSL certificates. De-
ploying updates on all devices can be also done through BIG-IQ. It is possible 
to backup device configurations, which makes fallback easy in case of a mis-
configuration. (F5 2016h.)  
 
5 TINY CORE LINUX 
Tiny Core is a Linux distribution aiming to be as small as possible. It is highly 
modular and has all the basic functions of a typical Linux distribution. How-
ever, it does not come with any unnecessary software and the users install 
what they need. (Tiny Core Team 2007.) 
By default, Tiny Core is not designed to be installed onto a hard drive, instead 
it is loaded from a storage device to RAM. This makes the system run fast and 
it protects the files from changing, which ensures that the system is running 
properly every time you run it. Installing Tiny Core to a hard drive is still possi-
ble, but it is not an original goal of the project. Applications are also installed 
and loaded on RAM by default, and thus wiped after a reboot. (Kasanen 
2013.) 
In the default mode, cloud/internet, Tiny Core loads on RAM, and Apps tool is 
used to download the applications the user wants to use. This is done after 
every reboot since the applications are not stored in a hard drive. This makes 
the system and applications run fast, because everything is loaded on RAM. 
Mount mode is the recommended mode for using Tiny Core. In this mode, 
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persistent storage is used to store the applications the user wants to use. A 
supported partition is needed on a disk to use this mode. Supported partitions 
types are ext2, ext3, ext4 and vfat. The applications are stored in a directory 
called tce on the partition, and can be configured to be mounted when booting 
the system. There is also copy mode, where the applications are not mounted, 
but instead copied from the partition to RAM. This mode takes longer to boot, 
because of the applications need to be copied, which takes more time than 
mounting. However, this way the applications run faster. (Kasanen 2013.) 
A persistent install is possible using the Tiny Core installation tool, which 
comes with the default release image. There is a graphical installer and a 
command-line installer available. After installing, the system applications can 
be installed using Apps tool, which has an option for persistent installation. If a 
graphical user interface is not used, Tiny Core Extension: Application 
Browser, can be used to browse and install applications. The tool is accessed 
with the command tce-ab. A command called tce-load can be also used to in-
stall applications. This is a non-interactive version of the application installer, 
and the user needs to know the name of the package they want to install. In 
order to keep persistent files in the system, they need to be listed in /opt/.file-
tool.lst file. By default, the file has the /home/tc directory listed. There is also a 
file /opt/.xfiletool.lst to exclude files from the filetool utility. Backups are written 
in a file called mydata.tgz. The /home/tc/.xsession, /home/tc/.profile and 
/opt/bootlocal.sh files can be used to store and execute configurations. Addi-
tional scripts can be created to the /opt/ directory. (Kasanen 2013.) 
 
6 IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation covers the process of creating a working data center sce-
nario for the virtual laboratory environment and creating a basic case study for 
that environment. The focus of the implementation was the application deliv-
ery controllers, but some server and client machines were created to serve the 
needs of the scenario. The configuration of the other network devices for the 
case study is also covered within the implementation. 
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6.1 Licensing the software 
The work on the laboratory scenario began with activating the F5 BIG-IP Vir-
tual Edition license. The Virtual Edition image was run as standalone on a 
VMware Workstation hypervisor. The reseller provided two licenses, but it was 
not known what they were for. At first, the licenses were inputted to the initial 
configuration wizard at the web interface, but there was an error message tell-
ing that the license was not a valid F5 license. After contacting the reseller, it 
became clear that one of the licenses was a pool license, which allowed for 25 
instances of BIG-IP VE to be activated. The pool license needed to be acti-
vated on a BIG-IQ Virtual Edition, which would then provision the licenses to 
the BIG-IP devices. The other license provided would activate the BIG-IQ VE 
system. 
Work continued after downloading the image for BIG-IQ VE. It was also run on 
a VMware Workstation hypervisor and was activated with the license pro-
vided. The licenses were accepted by the device and then it was the matter of 
activating the BIG-IP image. An activated BIG-IP base image would be ideal 
for the virtual laboratory, since then the users do not activate the images 
themselves. The activation with BIG-IQ would not work on the VMware Work-
station, and it was thought that it might be an issue with the routing in the hy-
pervisor. The BIG-IQ image was moved to the virtual laboratory, running on a 
VMware ESXi hypervisor, along with the BIG-IP image. The devices were con-
nected to a bridge that allows all traffic to pass through, so there should be no 
problems with routing. However, there was a problem with the BIG-IQ license 
since it had gone inoperative. 
Following logs were from the actual devices TMOS command line, when the 
problem was troubleshooted: 
admin@bigiq ModuleNotLicensed:LICENSE INOPERATIVE 
/Common tmos# Apr 26 02:06:08 bigiq emerg mcpd[4976]: 
01070608:0: License is not operational expired or digital signature 
does not match contents. 
admin@bigiq ModuleNotLicensed:LICENSE INOPERATIVE 
/Common tmos# show /sys license 
Can't load license, may not be operational 
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admin@bigiq ModuleNotLicensed:LICENSE INOPERATIVE 
/Common tmos# install /sys license registration‐key *license om-
mitted* 
License server has returned an exception. 
Fault code: 51092 
Fault text: Error 51092, This license has already been activated 
on a different unit. Please contact technical support for assistance 
 
A show command used to show the license activated on the device returned 
an error telling that the license cannot be loaded. To fix the problem, reactivat-
ing the license was tested with a command used to install licenses, but it re-
turned an error that the license was already activated elsewhere, and that help 
from technical support would be needed to reactivate the license. The reseller 
was contacted about the license and they contacted F5 support to get the li-
cense deactivated. A new BIG-IQ VE image for KVM hypervisors was down-
loaded to compliment the virtual laboratory running KVM. After working with 
the reseller, the BIG-IQ VE was finally activated on the virtual laboratory, but 
the pool license needed to be reset, since it was activated on the old image. 
After deactivating the license and activating in on the new BIG-IQ VE, an acti-
vated BIG-IQ VE base image was ready to be used to activate the BIG-IP de-
vices. 
Apparently, the licenses are linked to a certain MAC address of the network 
adapter. When you move the image from one hypervisor to another, the MAC 
address changes, since there is only a virtual MAC address on a virtual net-
work adapter. It had to be made sure that the MAC address would not change 
and this could be achieved by using the virtual laboratory device files. The de-
vice files tell the KVM hypervisor a specific command to run each device and 
these files can be used to specify the MAC address of the network interfaces. 
These files with the correct addresses were preserved, because at this point it 
was the only way to make sure that the addresses stay the same. When you 
made changes that needed to be applied on the virtual laboratory web inter-
faces device manager, it would always regenerate new MAC addresses. This 
meant that you would then need to overwrite or fix the device file for the BIG-
IQ by hand. In a later version of the virtual laboratory, this issue was fixed and 
you can now specify the MAC address in the web interface. 
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The BIG-IP VE image still needed to be activated to make a working base im-
age. The BIG-IP was added to the devices managed by the BIG-IQ, but when 
the activation the device was tested, it was not successful. After looking at the 
/var/log/restjavad.0.log file, which contains many logs for troubleshooting, it 
was clear that something was wrong with the system. Both devices, BIG-IQ 
and BIG-IP, had a message saying that the license was an invalid F5 license. 
After providing logs and qkview files for the reseller that was in contact with F5 
support, it was found out that this was due to a bug in the BIG-IP VE. The bug, 
numbered with the code 565137, affected mainly hosts running on a KVM hy-
pervisor. When the file /var/log/ltm is accessed, there will be an error “Dossier 
error 16”.  This is due to the output of dmidecode -s system-uuid differing from 
the value provided in the /sys/class/dmi/id/product_uuid. In this case, the 
value was nonexistent in both cases. The bug was fixed in the version 12.1.0 
HF1, but had yet not been released. The problem was escalated by the re-
seller to a F5 escalation engineer, whose job would be to provide a patch to fix 
the problem. The patch never arrived, which meant that the project was on 
hold until the official update was released. 
After the new version was released, a whole new image of BIG-IP Virtual Edi-
tion, version 12.1.0.0.0.1434, was downloaded and installed on the virtual la-
boratory. The licensing was now successful on the first try. After two BIG-IP 
devices were activated, the BIG-IQ was removed from the laboratory to save 
resources. This turned out to be a problem since the licenses would fail after a 
while. It meant that the BIG-IP needs to contact the BIG-IQ after a while, so it 
was reintroduced to the laboratory. 
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6.2 Creating a working scenario 
6.2.1 Networking 
 
Figure 4. The full scenario topology and addressing 
 
After licensing issues were sorted out, it was the matter of creating a working 
network. A virtual laboratory topology, illustrated on figure 4, was created dur-
ing the licensing phase. The network contains two Cisco IOSv routers on the 
edge of the network which would connect the network to a wide area network. 
Two routers were used to ensure redundancy. A wide area network would be 
simulated using an ethernet bridge that would pass all the traffic through. The 
traffic would travel from the routers to one of the two switches also running 
Cisco IOSv software. The links between the routers and switches were config-
ured as access ports using the external VLAN 101. 
The switches were attached with each other through two interfaces with a 
port-channel, using the link aggregation control protocol. This would make the 
interfaces work as one logical interface, sharing the configurations made on 
the link. This would also allow load balancing between the interfaces. How-
ever, there were a couple of problems when using this technique between the 
link. First problem was that the protocol would sometimes fail during the nego-
tiation phase and the link would never go up. Tweaking the delay, for the links, 
22 
 
on the virtual laboratory settings helped a bit, but it was not as consistent as 
you would hope it to be. Another problem arose when packet storms started to 
form between the link. It is not known why this started to happen, since there 
were no clear loops. The spanning tree protocol, which job is to prevent loops, 
seemed to be working as it should be. The MAC addresses of the interfaces 
were checked to ensure there were no duplicates, but none were found. Up-
dating to a newer version of IOSv did not help either. After this it was decided 
that the port-channel should be abandoned and a single trunk link between 
the devices was to be used. 
The ADCs were to be attached to the switches using link aggregation control 
protocol and trunking, to ensure high availability and load balancing. This was 
soon abandoned since the BIG-IP VE does not support link aggregation (F5 
2016). The link used was configured as a trunk to allow several VLANs. Four 
servers were attached to the switches using access ports on the internal 
VLAN 102. The servers have two interfaces with one connected to each 
switch and each of the interfaces have their own IP address. This would allow 
better availability and load balancing. An HTTP virtual server with basic load 
balancing was configured on the ADC. The configuration of the ADC will be 
looked at in more detail at a later stage, but basically each of the server inter-
face addresses are listed on the BIG-IP virtual server and it should perform 
load balancing between these interfaces. The server can be accessed by us-
ing a separate address assigned to the virtual server. 
After the configuration, there was a problem because the ADC was not able to 
communicate with the servers in the internal VLAN. The ADC monitors the 
availability of the servers using configurable monitors. These monitors are 
chosen or created by the needs of the type of server used. They need to be 
accurate so that they confirm that the service on the server is working 
properly, if the availability cannot be confirmed, the service will be marked as 
unavailable. Using an ICMP monitor, the status was unavailable. Looking at 
the ARP table of the ADC, it seemed that the addresses were not resolving. 
By monitoring the traffic using the cable tap feature of the virtual laboratory, it 
became clear that the ARP request packets were leaving the ADC without 
dot1q tags. This meant that the packets would not be directed to the access 
ports using the internal VLAN. At first it seemed this might be a misconfigura-
tion on the interface VLAN settings, but this was not the case. After trying 
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some different configurations on the interface, it was an idea that maybe 
changing the virtual network adapter would fix the problem. It seems that the 
E1000 network adapter that was used for the devices would not work with 
dot1q tagging. This was discovered to be true, after changing to VMXNET3 
adapter. With the adapter, the ARP requests would leave as tagged and re-
solve without any problems. Now the ICMP monitor would show the server as 
available, however the HTTP monitor confirmed that the HTTP service was 
unavailable. Virtio network adapter was also tested on the ADC, but the inter-
faces would just flap up and down. BIG-IP Virtual Edition should support the 
virtio adapter on KVM hypervisor (F5 2016j). 
The HTTP monitor sends a simple HTTP GET request, which the server 
should reply with an ACK packet. Cable tap was used to monitor the traffic 
and it was noticed that the ACK package was never received from the server. 
Tcpdump was used to monitor the traffic arriving at the network adapter of the 
server and the traffic arrived without problems. However, the adapter would 
not accept the packages. Further inspections revealed that the frames were 
considered too short. Analyzing the ethernet frame on Wireshark seemed that 
it was the right length and nothing out of ordinary could be seen. The server 
adapter was also changed to VMXNET3, but this did not change anything. 
Changing the adapter back to E1000 on both ends fixed the problem. After 
setting the interfaces to send the traffic as untagged, a handshake could be 
seen using cable tap, but this meant that VLAN tagging could not be used on 
the ADC. The VMXNET3 adapter would seem to be best supported by F5, as 
it is the one used on ESXi hypervisors, which makes the problems unusual. 
Later the virtio adapter was further tested by including it in the installation file 
of BIG-IP and BIG-IQ. New scenario was installed and licensing the BIG-IP 
devices was tested. However, when trying to connect to the BIG-IQ web 
interface using the ADC client machine, the site was never reached. When 
analyzing the traffic using cable tap, the machines seemed to be talking with 
each other. A lot of TCP retransmissions were seen between the devices. 
When looking at the interface on the ADC client using ethtool, a climbing 
number of packages of wrong length could be seen. The problem seemed 
similar to the one with VMXNET3, but a clear reason for it could not be seen. 
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Since VLANs could no longer be used, the ADCs needed to be attached to the 
switches using three interfaces, one for each VLAN. Each of the interfaces 
was configured as access VLANs on the switch. The HTTP monitor status 
was still offline, so telnet was used to test the connection. 
 
Figure 5. Attempting a telnet connection to the HTTP port of the server 
 
On figure 5, telnet connection to port 80 of the server returned a message tell-
ing it was a bad request. The HTTP connection was now working, but the 
monitor was somewhat wrong. The server did not answer HTTP 1.0 GET re-
quests, which meant that a custom monitor needed to be done, to support 
HTTP 1.1. The custom monitor had a couple of more parameters, as opposed 
to the default one. 
Default monitor send string: 
 GET / 
Custom HTTP 1.1 monitor string: 
 GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.102.112\r\n 
The difference is that the custom send string tells the server that it is using 
HTTP 1.1 and it has a line telling the host it is meant for. A real-life scenario 
would use the domain of the server, rather than the IP address for the host. 
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After creating and taking the monitor in use, the HTTP server access log was 
checked. 
 
Figure 6. Successful HTTP GET requests seen on the access log file 
 
On figure 6, successfully received GET requests can be seen. They arrive 
from the address of the ADC 192.168.102.11 to the server located in 
192.168.102.112. The status message ‘200’ implies that the request has been 
successful (Fielding 1999). The connection from a client to the servers was 
still not working. The traffic between the devices was monitored using cable 
tap. 
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Figure 7. TCP handshake of a standard virtual server with layer 7 functionalities (F5 2007) 
 
 
Figure 8. Captured TCP handshake. 
 
In figure 8, the connection between the ADC and the client seemed to be 
working, as the 3-way TCP handshake was successful. HTTP GET request 
was received and acknowledged by the ADC. Figure 7 tells that after receiving 
the ACK package, the ADC should choose a pool member to establish a TCP 
connection with. However, the ADC would not try to establish a connection to 
a pool member and the connection was reset. After some investigation, this 
was due to secure network address translation, or SNAT, not being enabled 
on the virtual server. It had been turned off at an earlier stage when trouble-
shooting connection problems. Auto-map setting for SNAT was enabled and 
the connection worked without problems. 
  
27 
 
6.2.2 Hypervisors and servers 
At the beginning of the project there was an idea of running a hypervisor in-
side the virtual laboratory. The servers would run inside the hypervisor thus 
simulating a real data centers which usually use hypervisors to run the serv-
ers. VMware ESXi would not boot up inside the virtual laboratory, or at least 
not by default. After this an open-source hypervisor, XenServer, was tested. 
The hypervisor booted up inside the virtual laboratory, and the management 
interface worked. However, the boot times for the machines inside the hyper-
visor were too long. A machine, which normally booted in a minute, took over 
an hour to boot up. Since the main focus of the project is application delivery 
controllers, the idea of running a hypervisor inside the virtual laboratory in the 
confines of this project was abandoned, since it would have most likely been a 
project of its own. 
A CentOS 7 server was created to use as a base image for the servers. An 
Apache HTTP server was installed to serve a webpage, which was a default 
Wordpress page. MariaDB SQL database software and PHP were installed, 
because they were needed for the Wordpress to run correctly. After the server 
base image was deployed to the laboratory, the Wordpress site did not load 
correctly. Wordpress has some issues if the IP address of the server changes. 
Modifications to the Wordpress configuration need to be done to fix this, so 
Wordpress was removed. This would not serve the purpose of easily deploya-
ble web servers in an environment where the IP addresses might often 
change. A basic webpage with some text was created to serve something 
from the HTTP server. An Ubuntu server running Lighttpd HTTP server was 
also used when troubleshooting issues with F5 HTTP monitors. Neither of 
these servers worked with the default HTTP monitor of the BIG-IP, and 
needed to use a custom HTTP 1.1 monitor. 
To save resources, it was decided that Tiny Core would be used to create 
some basic servers. When creating the image on VMWare Workstation hyper-
visor, it was important to use IDE as the hard disk type, since Tiny Core only 
supports IDE (Buys 2012). The installation was done using the official graph-
ical installer, which is can be accessed from the desktop after booting up the 
graphical user interface. A disk named sda was chosen on the first menu and 
other settings were right by default. Ext4 was used as the file system type and 
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nodhcp boot option code was added to disable the use of DHCP. The server 
was installed as Core Only, which means installing the system without a 
graphical interface, since there was no need for a graphical interface. 
After installation, before rebooting, the Apps tool was launched. An Apache 
HTTP server was installed by installing the httpd package. PHP and MariaDB 
were installed in case they would be needed in the future. A TCPdump tool, 
which can be used to analyze data arriving in a network interface, was in-
stalled for troubleshooting purposes. In the Apps tool, it was important to se-
lect the On-Boot option to ensure that the packages were saved on the disk 
and automatically loaded on the boot process. After installing the needed 
packages, the image was ready to be deployed into the virtual laboratory. The 
servers needed to be set up to serve a webpage using HTTP. 
All the text file modifications had to be done using the vi editor, which usually 
comes with almost every GNU/Linux distribution. What is important to know 
about the editor is that the i key is used access the insert mode, which allows 
to insert and manipulate the text. After the changes are made, the escape key 
is pressed to leave the insert mode. To write the changes and quit, :wq! is 
typed. If the user wants to discard the changes they made, they can quit by 
typing :q!. To run some setup commands on boot up, /opt/bootlocal.sh script 
was modified. The following lines were added to the script file: 
 
The first two lines setup the IP addresses to two network interfaces and the 
third line starts the Apache HTTP server. The network interfaces on Tiny Core 
start with eth0 and they increase in the increments of one. It was important to 
use the sudo command to run these commands as a super user, since other-
wise the commands would not work. 
A basic HTML site was created in the /usr/local/apache2/htdocs/index.html 
file, after removing the default index.html file. The following design was used 
for the site: 
sudo ifconfig eth0 192.168.102.111 netmask 255.255.255.0 
sudo ifconfig eth1 192.168.102.121 netmask 255.255.255.0 
sudo apachectl start 
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Very little content was added, but the most important thing is that every server 
had a different line telling which server they were. This would help to check 
and illustrate working load balancing. In order to have the Apache configura-
tion and HTML files stored persistently after a reboot, the /opt/.filetool.lst file 
needed to be edited. Following lines were added to the end of the file, to en-
sure that the changes would be stored: 
 
First line would store the contents of the directory holding the site content files, 
and the second line would ensure that the Apache configuration files would be 
stored. However, the Apache configuration was not modified, but the action 
was to ensure that if some modifications would be done in the future, they 
would be stored persistently. The following actions had to be done on all four 
servers manually, but after doing so working servers were ready. It would not 
be sensible for the users to create these configurations themselves, which 
meant that the servers needed to be made into base images. Since the im-
ages are split into a base image and a linked clone, they were to be com-
bined. This was done using a QEMU feature called convert. QEMU has a disk 
image utility that can be used to manage images, and it has a convert feature 
which can be used to combine the images into a new base image. The serv-
ers needed to be shut down before attempting the operation, since changes 
happening while they are running could corrupt the images. An example of the 
command that was used: 
  
The -c option is used for the compression of the image, -f option is for the orig-
inal format of the image, -O is the format of the output file, then the name of 
the file that is to be converted is inputted, and last the name of the output file. 
<h1>CYBER CORPORATION</h1> 
<br> 
Welcome to DCLAB server C1A! 
/usr/local/apache2/htdocs 
/usr/local/apache2/conf 
qemu-img convert -c -f qcow2 -O qcow2 C1A.img DCLAB-
C1A.img 
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After creating working server images, an attacker client image needed to be 
created. The attacker client would be used to attack the servers using tools to 
test for denial-of-service attack vulnerabilities. A new Tiny Core installation 
was created without a graphical interface. The attack tools needed to be com-
piled, since they were not available in the Tiny Core repository. This was done 
before rebooting the image after installation. Using Apps tool wget, compicetc 
and openssl packages were downloaded, and the first two were run only on 
RAM, since they would not be needed in the final image. Openssl package 
would, however, be needed for one of the attack tools. The wget tool is used 
to download the source code of the tools and compiletc has all the dependen-
cies needed to compile the tools. The attack tools that were installed were 
slowhttptest and thc-ssl-dos. Slowhttptest can be used to test for slow HTTP 
attacks, while thc-ssl-dos is a proof of concept tool for SSL renegotiation flood 
attack. 
The source for slowhttptest was downloaded using wget and extracted using 
tar -xzvf <package filename>. The directory was accessed and ./configure 
command was used to configure before compiling. The command make was 
used to compile the source code into working binary. After this, the tool was 
installed using sudo make install. The thc-ssl-dos tool was installed in the 
same way, except make all install was used instead of make and sudo make 
install. It was then made sure that the files would be saved by filetool. 
 
6.3 Creating a case study 
The goal for the case study was to provide a practice that would get the user 
started working with the laboratory. It was important to introduce the user to 
the basic functions and tools of the laboratory and BIG-IP. This was done by 
creating a basic configuration practice, which would make the network func-
tional, introduce the user to how the devices are managed and to where the 
configuration options are located. The goal was to configure the basic net-
working functions for the switches and routers, license the BIG-IP device us-
ing BIG-IQ, create a basic configuration for the BIG-IP, create load balancing 
between the servers and implement a couple of security features. The final 
case study can be found in appendix 1. 
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6.3.1 Basic network configuration 
To enable basic networking, the routers and switches were configured. The 
routers were configured with Hot Standby Routing Protocol, which makes the 
gateways redundant by having the gateway of the other router in a standby, 
when it sees that the other gateway is down it switches to the active mode. 
Both router interfaces are configured with an address, but instead of using 
these addresses to access the gateway, a virtual gateway address is used be-
tween the routers to access the gateway. (Li, Cole, Morton & Li 1998.) Both, 
the inside and outside gateways, were configured redundantly using HSRP. 
The switches needed to be configured with the appropriate VLANs, which 
were the external and internal VLANs. External VLAN, is the one that is next 
to the outside network, which means the interfaces facing the routers were 
configured as access ports using external VLAN. The interfaces facing servers 
were configured as access ports using internal VLAN, since they are in the in-
ternal network. Since the ADC device needs to have its own dedicated inter-
faces for each VLAN, because the dot1q tagging does not work with the 
E1000 network adapter, the interfaces facing ADC on the switch were config-
ured as access ports using the appropriate VLANs. The link between switches 
was configured as a trunk port to support multiple VLANs. 
 
6.3.2 ADC management and licensing 
The ADC needs to be assigned a management address, before it can be li-
censed using BIG-IQ. This is done using the traffic management operating 
system shell on the command line, which can be accessed with the command 
tmsh. The user needs to login to the command line using root as username 
and default as password. These are the default values, which can be changed 
if needed in the initial setup of the device. The setup is done after licensing. 
First the management DHCP service is disabled using modify sys db dhcli-
ent.mgmt value disable command. Management address is added using cre-
ate /sys management-ip [ip address/prefixlen] command. The changes are 
saved using save /sys config partitions all command. It is to be noted that 
when using Nordic keyboard, the forward slash needs to be inputted using the 
minus key next to the shift key. This is due to not being able to find a way to 
32 
 
change the keyboard layout to a Nordic layout. The regular methods of chang-
ing the keyboard layout on GNU/Linux systems seem to not work. The config-
uration can be checked by leaving the shell using quit command, and using 
ifconfig eth0 command on the bash shell. The first interface is the manage-
ment interface, which means it should always be the eth0 interface. 
The BIG-IP devices need to be licensed before they can be used, which is 
done using a BIG-IQ device. Using the ADC client machine, the BIG-IQ web 
interface can be accessed. The licensing and addressing for the BIG-IQ was 
done in an earlier stage and they are automatically available on the base im-
age. The BIG-IQ can be accessed from the IP address 192.168.100.20, but if 
needed, the address can be changed in exactly the same way as in the BIG-
IP devices. To log in to the BIG-IQ web interface, username admin and pass-
word admin are used.  
 
Figure 9. Adding a new device to BIG-IQ 
 
The devices are licensed by navigating to Device > Provisioning. Next to De-
vices there will be a + button, which can be used to add a new BIG-IP device. 
Figure 9 shows an example of the filled New device form. The management 
address and credentials of the BIG-IP are filled. Device Group is chosen as 
Managed BIG-IPs. Everything else can be left to their default values. After dis-
covering the device using the Discover button, the device is ready to be li-
censed. This is done by right clicking the device on the list, and choosing Li-
cense device. Pool licensing and the appropriate pool is selected and the de-
vice is then licensed. 
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6.3.3 Basic ADC configuration 
After the licensing is done, the BIG-IP device is ready to be configured. The 
web interface of the device is accessed using the ADC client machine by navi-
gating to the management address of the device. However, unlike BIG-IQ, the 
BIG-IP does not automatically redirect the user to the SSL secured connec-
tion. Since there is no unsecured connection available, the user needs to add 
https:// in front of the address. For example, if the management address of the 
device is 192.168.100.11, the user needs to connect the address 
https://192.168.100.11 to reach the web interface. The default credentials for 
the device are username admin and password admin. On log in, the user is 
first prompted to a setup utility to configure all the basic settings for the device. 
 
Figure 10. Importing device certificates 
 
Navigating through the setup, in Resource Provisioning more modules can be 
activated, but the default modules are enough for the case study. In Device 
Certificates, new device certificates should be imported. A self-signed certifi-
cate was created earlier on the ADC client machine and can be found on the 
home directory of the Root user. Figure 10 shows that Import Type of Certifi-
cate and Key should be chosen, and the correct files are selected using the 
Browse button. The certificate source file ends with cert and the source key 
ends with key. After importing, the certificate user is logged out of the device, 
because the certificate for the connection has changed. Since it is a self-
signed certificate, the browser tells that the connection is untrusted. This does 
not matter in a laboratory environment, but in real world applications a signed 
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certificate should be acquired. After logging back in, the applied certificate 
should be seen, showing that it was successfully imported. 
 
Figure 11. Filled platform settings 
 
Next platform settings are configured. As seen on figure 11, the management 
port settings should be correct, since they were configured using the traffic 
management shell. A management route could be added if needed, but since 
the traffic is directed through a bridge it is not necessary. The host name of 
the device needs to be a fully qualified domain name, which means that for 
example adc1.dclab.fi could be used. It is also desirable to change the time 
zone to UTC. The credentials can be changed or the default values can be in-
putted to keep using them. In real-world applications, the credentials should 
always be changed, but since the laboratory is not connected to any public 
network, it does not matter. 
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Figure 12. Example configuration for external VLAN 
 
Network settings are configured by creating internal, external and high availa-
bility VLANs. The addressing is done using the designed addressing plan. The 
floating IP address is the default gateway that the devices in the network use, 
which means the traffic is directed to the ADC. As seen on figure 12, the ex-
ternal VLAN needs its own default gateway, which is the HSRP floating IP ad-
dress of the routers on the same network. The VLAN ID tag is the same tag 
that is used in the switches. However, the traffic is not tagged since VLAN tag-
ging does not work. The VLAN interface wanted is chosen and tagging is set 
untagged. Only one VLAN per interface can be used. The interface should be 
connected to the switch port which has been configured as an access port for 
the same VLAN. NTP or DNS are not configured, but ConfigSync, Failover 
and Mirroring are set to use high availability VLAN. However, failover or con-
figuration synchronization are not configured in this case study, because they 
do not seem to work reliably. Using configuration synchronization might have 
been a cause of some boot loops and other problems on the ADCs. Some-
times the synchronization works for a while, but after some time the link starts 
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working unreliably. The ADCs start telling that the high availability is offline, 
and because of this they do not synchronize. The connection might come 
back up, but this has caused some boot loops after a while. This is most likely 
due to corrupted configurations. Because high availability cannot be used, it 
means that after the settings are ready and the Finished button can be 
pressed to finish the setup. 
 
6.3.4 Load Balancing 
To start load balancing between the HTTP servers, a server pool and a virtual 
server need to be created. The load balancing happens between the config-
ured pool members. By navigating to Local Traffic > Pools > Pool List, it is 
possible to create a new pool. 
 
Figure 13. Example server pool configuration 
 
Figure 13 shows an example where all server interfaces have been added to 
the pool members. The information for each specific interface is filled and the 
Add button is used to add them to the pool. The load balancing method used 
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is left as Round Robin. The pool is named and health monitors are added. 
Since the servers are HTTP servers, the http monitor is used to monitor of 
availability of the HTTP service. Additionally, gateway_icmp monitor is used to 
monitor the availability of the interface. After finishing the settings, the pool 
members should all be available, which is indicated by a green dot next to the 
member in the members list. 
 
Figure 14. Part of the virtual server settings 
 
After the pool is created it needs to be associated with a virtual server. By 
navigating to Local Traffic > Virtual Servers > Virtual Server List, it is possible 
to create new virtual servers. Figure 14 shows a part of the settings needed 
for the virtual server. The server is named and standard type of server is used. 
The source address is 0.0.0.0/0, which means that the inbound traffic can 
originate anywhere. The destination address is the address that is used to ac-
cess the virtual server. This is the address the client connects to. Default 
HTTP service port is used, protocol used is TCP and HTTP profile is set as 
http. It is important to set the source address translation to Auto-map to en-
sure that address translation works correctly. The server pool created earlier 
is selected as the default pool. Now the server should be accessible by the cli-
ent machine using the virtual server IP address. 
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Next a pool for gateway load balancing is created. The router interfaces on the 
external VLAN are added to a pool and used as a gateway pool. First HSRP 
must be removed from the interfaces, which happens with the no standby 
<process number> command on the router interface. As before, a new pool 
was created with the gateway addresses as members. This time only gate-
way_icmp monitor is used to monitor the gateway status. 
 
Figure 15. Using pool as an external default gateway 
 
By navigating to Network > Routes, the user can manage the external_de-
fault_gateway. Figure 15 shows that the resource has been changed to Use 
pool, and that the pool created for gateways has been selected as the pool. 
By updating the settings, the load balancing between pool members is acti-
vated. It is to be noted that the load balancing only happens between the gate-
ways when leaving the ADC. Traffic coming from the outside network comes 
through the active HSRP interface and through the same device. It would 
most likely make more sense to use HSRP on both gateways instead of mix-
ing up technologies, but this is something that was tested and included in the 
case study, since there are cases where using load balancing between gate-
ways makes sense. 
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6.3.5 SSL offloading 
To implement SSL offloading, the certificates need to be imported into the sys-
tem. This means navigating to System > File Management > SSL Certificate 
List to import the needed files. The certificate and key need to be imported 
separately. 
 
Figure 16. Importing the certificate file 
 
As seen on figure 16, the import type Certificate is selected, the certificate is 
named and the certificate file is selected using the Browse button. In this case 
study, the same self-signed certificate that is used for the device certificate, is 
used also for the servers. The certificate is located on the home directory of 
the root user of the ADC client machine. The key is also imported using the 
same method, but import type Key is selected. 
 
Figure 17. Adding SSL certificate to the key chain of a client SSL profile 
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A new client SSL profile needs to be created, to use the certificate with a vir-
tual server. The profile can be created by navigating to Local Traffic > Profiles 
> SSL > Client. First the profile is named and clientssl is used as the parent 
profile. The certificate needs to be added to a certificate key chain, which is 
done as seen in figure 17. By clicking the Add button the user is prompted 
with a window where the right files are selected. The Certificate, key and chain 
are selected and they are added to the key chain. After saving the changes, 
the profile is ready to be used. 
 
Figure 19. Creating an HTTPS virtual server 
 
A new virtual server is created to SSL. Like shown on figure 19, this time the 
service port 443 for HTTPS is selected. The SSL client profile is selected to 
use SSL offloading using the certificate. All the other settings are the same as 
in the HTTP server and the same address can be used. After saving the set-
tings, SSL offloading is functional. This can be confirmed by navigating to the 
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address of the server using the HTTPS protocol, for example 
https://192.168.101.111. 
Redirecting the HTTP traffic to HTTPS is done by creating a policy. The policy 
can be created by navigating to Local Traffic > Policies > Policy List and using 
the Create button. The policy is named to describe the contents of the policy, 
for example HTTPtoHTTPS. The strategy setting is left at Execute first match-
ing rule. After the policy is created a rule is added by using the Create button 
next to Rules. It is also named to describe the contents of the rule, which can 
in this case be the same name as the policy itself. The match conditions are 
left as All traffic to match all traffic. By using the + next to Do the following 
when the traffic is matched, a task is created to execute when the traffic 
matches the conditions. A redirect task is added from the drop-down menu 
and the following line is added as the location: 
tcl:https://[getfield [HTTP::host] ":" 1][HTTP::uri] 
The changes are then saved, and using the policy is saved and published the 
drop-down menu next to the Save Draft button in the policy overview. The pol-
icy is then activated on the HTTP virtual server to enable redirection. By navi-
gating to the virtual server settings and accessing the resources tab, a policy 
list can be found. By using the Manage button, a list of available policies can 
be seen and the desired policy is moved to the enabled policies. After finishing 
the settings, the policy is active and should work right away. If the redirection 
fails, the most likely cause is a typing error in the location line and should be 
double checked. It was also noticed that it can sometimes take a moment to 
get active. 
 
6.3.6 Mitigating slowloris attack 
A slowloris denial of service attack was tested against the virtual server of the 
ADC. The attack was conducted using a tool called slowhttptest, which can be 
used to test slowloris attack and other derivatives. The test proved that the vir-
tual server was easy to knock down using one client slowloris attack. Next it 
was the case of mitigating the attack. Mitigating the attack would be done us-
ing iRule provided by F5. New iRule can be created by navigating to Local 
Traffic > iRules > iRule List. The iRule is named and the rule itself is provided 
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in the Definition section. The following iRule is used to mitigate a slowloris at-
tack: 
 when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { 
 set rtimer 0 
 after 1000 { 
 if { not $rtimer} { 
 drop 
 } 
 } 
 } 
 when HTTP_REQUEST { 
 set rtimer 1 
 } 
(F5 2009) 
The way the iRule works is that, when an HTTP request is not completed in 
one second, the connection is dropped. This could also affect users with a 
slow connection if the request cannot be completed within a second. iRules 
are activated on a virtual server basis by navigating to virtual server settings 
and Resources tab. There is a list of iRules that can be managed. The iRule is 
then moved from the list of available iRules to the enabled iRules. After finish-
ing the configuration, the iRule is active. Now the slowloris attack should be 
unsuccessful. However, when trying out the attack again it was still success-
ful. Even though slowloris attack does not generate a lot of traffic, because of 
the limitations of running virtual switches and routers, it seemed that lines 
were getting excessive amounts of traffic. The attack needed to be toned 
down, so that the network before the virtual server could cope with the traffic, 
but it would still knockdown the virtual server. The following command with the 
settings toned down was found to be good for the purpose, and would be used 
in the case study to demonstrate a slowloris attack: 
slowhttpstest -c 10000 -H -i 5 -r 50 -t GET -u https://www.dclab.fi 
To break down the command used, the -c value is the number of connections, 
-H tells the program to run in slowloris mode, -i value is the interval until the 
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program follows up with the follow up data, -r is the number on connections 
per second, -t is the used verb and -u is the url of the site that is tested. The 
program can be interrupted with the regular keyboard combination used to 
cancel running commands CTRL + C. 
 
Figure 20. Slowhttptest running slowloris attack without mitigation 
 
 
Figure 21. Slowhttptest running slowloris attack with mitigation 
 
The command was tested with the iRule disabled and it knocked down the vir-
tual server, but when the iRule was again enabled the server stayed available. 
This was confirmed from the status monitor of the slowhttptest program and 
can be seen in figures 20 and 21. The service was also confirmed to be una-
vailable using the browser of the client machine. When the attack began, the 
site became quickly unavailable for the client, but when the iRule was enabled 
the site remained available for the client. In figure 21, A fast rising number of 
closed connections can be seen on the slowhttptest statistics, which indicates 
that the iRule works correctly. When using an HTTP profile on the server a 
real BIG-IP device should be able to block a single client slowloris attack, but 
in the virtual laboratory environment it could not be confirmed. The HTTP pro-
file resets the connection when the maximum header size is exceeded by the 
attack. (F5, 2009.) In a real-life situation where an HTTP profile is not used, 
the HTTP servers should be correctly configured to render slow HTTP attacks 
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useless, but the iRule could be used to mitigate the attack if needed. For ex-
ample, if the attack is distributed or when the servers are not in the care of the 
network administrator. 
6.3.7 Mitigating SSL renegotiation flood attack 
Vulnerability to SSL renegotiation flood attack was also tested against the vir-
tual server. The principle is that if the server allows the client to renegotiate 
the SSL handshake indefinitely, the server is vulnerable to the attack. The fol-
lowing command was executed from the user client machine to test for the 
vulnerability: 
openssl s_client -connect www.dclab.fi:443 
An HTTP GET request was executed by typing GET / HTTP/1.0 and pressing 
enter. After this, the connection was renegotiated five times by typing R and 
pressing enter. The server did not reset the connection, but instead the pro-
gram lets the user to renegotiate five times before the session needs to be re-
started. However, it was possible to do this indefinitely, which meant that the 
server was vulnerable. With an automated tool that repeats the renegotiation 
process, the attack would be successful. It needs to be noted that the slow-
loris iRule needed to be disabled to do this test, because the connection 
would otherwise reset before the commands could be typed. The iRule would 
not, however, protect from this attack, because the process would be faster 
with an automated attack tool. Like the slowloris attack, the attack could be 
mitigated using iRule endorsed by F5. The following iRule was created and 
activated the same way as before, but only on the HTTPS virtual server: 
when RULE_INIT { 
 set static::maxquery 5 
 set static::mseconds 60000 
} 
when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { 
 set ssl_hs_reqs 0 
} 
when CLIENTSSL_HANDSHAKE { 
 incr ssl_hs_reqs 
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 after $static::mseconds { if {$ssl_hs_reqs > 0} {incr 
ssl_hs_reqs -1} } 
 if { $ssl_hs_reqs > $static::maxquery } { 
  after 5000 
  log "Handshake attack detected, drop-
ping [IP::client_addr]:[TCP::client_port]" 
  drop 
 } 
} 
 
(Holmes 2011b) 
 
Figure 22. SSL renegotiation flood attack countermeasure iRule workflow (Holmes 2011a) 
 
After implementing the iRule, the renegotiation could be performed five times 
and the connection was stalled and dropped after a while. Another connection 
was not possible within a minute after the attack was detected. The iRule 
sends a notice to the BIG-IP logs that an attack was detected and dropped. In 
figure 22, the workflow of the iRule can be seen. After a successful hand-
shake, the number of requests is counted and when the maximum number is 
reached, the connection pauses for 5 seconds before dropping it. If the limit is 
not reached, the connection will continue to work normally. (Holmes 2011a.) 
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Figure 23. BIG-IP logs after using an attack tool for the iRule testing 
 
A proof of concept SSL renegotiation flood attack tool called thc-ssl-dos was 
also tested against the unprotected virtual server. The tool was created by a 
French hacking group The Hacker’s Choice. It can be used to perform an 
attack against any server that allows SSL renegotiation. (Holmes 2011a.) 
When the attack was launched against the virtual server, the service became 
not as responsive, but it never went unavailable. There were many 
handshakes happening and the tool was working, but it seemed that the 
switches could not keep up with the amount of packets being transmitted by 
the tool. A growing number of input errors could be seen on the switch 
interface as runts. Number of connections was limited from the default 400, 
but the input errors were still happening. It did not seem that the renegotiation 
itself was the cause for the slow responses, but the connection to the virtual 
server instead. Hardware BIG-IP should be able to withstand an attack from a 
single client, because of its crypto-processors (Holmes 2011a). It was not 
known if there is some software that would also do the trick of blocking an 
attack from one client, or it is just that the attack was weakened by the 
connection between the attacker and the ADC. The server was protected 
using the iRule and the logs were showing blocked attacks. As seen on figure 
23, the connections seemed to be dropping as they should be, but the page 
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was still not as responsive, which would indicate that the cause is the 
connection instead of the renegotiation. 
 
7 IDEAS FOR FURTHER PROJECTS 
There are a great number of things that can be done to develop this scenario 
further, since not all features work yet. The troubleshooting of the VLAN and 
synchronization issues of the ADCs, and looking in to the switch LACP issues, 
could be done as a project. The virtio network adapter should be functional, 
but the reason why it does not work is not known. It might be because all the 
links are not using the same adapter. It was not tested if the IOSv switches 
and routers support virtio adapter. One idea would be to replace the IOSv 
switches with OpenSwitch virtual appliances. This was something that would 
have been tested, if there were enough time within this project. 
Creating more advanced case studies should also be a possibility since this 
project only scratches the surface of what the ADCs are capable of. An entire 
thesis work about iRules would most likely be a possibility and would provide 
a great resource for further development of the data center courses. 
One of the more interesting projects would be trying to run a hypervisor inside 
the virtual laboratory. It could be used to simulate a more realistic data center 
server environment and would serve the purpose of this scenario perfectly. In 
theory, this should be possible but needs more advanced settings to be ena-
bled to run properly. 
Some ideas for the Cyberlab ADCs came to mind while doing this project. SSL 
offloading has been preliminary implemented into Cyberlab, but it has not 
been fully tested to be working with the servers needed. HTTP to HTTPS redi-
rection could be implemented if needed. Advantages of different HTTP profiles 
could be studied. Server-side SSL traffic could offer more protection for the 
traffic. The hardening of the ADCs is one thing that could be considered. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
Overall the project had a lot of variety. It was not just the implementation of 
application delivery controllers as one might have thought, but instead there 
were many things involving troubleshooting, servers and other network de-
vices as well. Valuable troubleshooting experience was acquired from the pro-
ject as there was much to troubleshoot, so much that everything could not be 
resolved within this project. 
Working with the support to resolve the licensing issues was a great experi-
ence on what to look for when trying to resolve issues. A lot of information and 
logs needed to be provided, and it became clearer as to what kind of infor-
mation is necessary. The licensing issues, however, were a bit of a disap-
pointment since they took up a lot of time from the implementation. Because 
of that, many of ideas had to be left untested. It would have been great to get 
to know one of the more interesting features iRules better, because it seems 
like a powerful tool. Because of the lack of experience, it would most likely 
have taken some time to create your own scripts. 
A lot of knowledge about application delivery and ADCs was learned while 
studying for and carrying out the project. At present, the knowledge about ap-
plication oriented networking is valuable and will only grow to be more valua-
ble in the future. 
Even though there were several problems, the project can be considered suc-
cessful. A working scenario and case study was created to serve the datacen-
ter courses. Most of the basic functions so far have worked without problems, 
at least the ones that are necessary. Some functions such as VLAN tagging 
and synchronization between ADCs had to be left out since a fix for either one 
could not be found. 
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Basic networking 
1. Configure addressing and HSRP on the routers 
2. Create the VLANs needed on the switches: 
101 external 
102 internal 
200 ha 
3. Configure switch ports as appropriate access ports and trunk between switches 
4. Ping from the user client to the HSRP gateways 
Management addresses and licensing 
1. Access the ADC1 terminal with the credentials root/default 
2. Access the traffic management operating system shell 
 
tmsh 
 
3. Disable DHCP on management port 
 
modify sys db dhclient.mgmt value disable 
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4. Configure the management address  
 
create /sys management-ip [ip address/prefixlen] 
 
5. Save changes  
 
save /sys config partitions all 
 
6. Exit the shell 
 
quit 
 
7. Check the management address 
 
 ifconfig eth0 
 
8. To license the ADC1, access the BIG-IQ device using the ADC client by navigating to 
https://192.168.100.20 with the browser 
9. Login with the credentials admin/admin 
10. Navigate to Device > Provisioning 
11. Add a new device using the + button 
 
 
12. Right click the device and choose license device. License the device using the pool license. 
 
Basic configuration of the ADC 
1. Access the management address of the ADC1 using the browser. Remember to use 
HTTPS! 
2. Use the credentials admin/admin 
3. Device certificate is imported using certificate and key located on the home directory of the 
ADC client 
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4. Navigate to platform settings 
5. Name the device using a fully qualified domain name e.g. adc1.dclab.fi 
6. Set the Time Zone as UTC 
7. Next create the VLANs 
 
 
 
Appendix 1/4 
 
8. DO NOT use VLAN tagging 
9. Leave Port lockdown settings to default 
10. For default gateway on external VLAN, use the HSRP gateway created earlier 
11. After creating VLANs the Setup Utility can be exited. Failover is not configured. 
 
Load balancing 
1. To start load balancing, first create a pool of servers start by navigating to Local Traffic > 
Pools > Pool List 
 
 
 
2. Use ‘gateway_icmp’ and ‘http’ health monitors for availability checking 
3. Use Round Robin as load balancing method 
4. Service port is 80 for HTTP 
5. Add all the server interfaces, two on each server, eight in total 
6. When finished, access the Pool list and select the pool 
7. Check that all the servers are available, which is indicated by a green dot 
8. Create a virtual server. Start by navigating to Local Traffic > Virtual Servers > Virtual Server 
List 
 
Appendix 1/5 
 
 
 
9. Use source address 0.0.0.0/0 to allow all source addresses 
10. The destination address is an address for the virtual server that is used to access the 
service. e.g. 192.168.101.111 
11. Use the HTTP port and select http as HTTP Profile 
12. Under Resources, access the drop-down menu of Default Pool and select the pool created 
earlier 
13. After saving the settings load balancing should be active, and can be tested using the User 
machines browser to access the address of the virtual server 
Load balancing between gateways 
1. Remove HSRP from VLAN 101 (Not from the outside network) 
2. Create a pool for the router interfaces as before, but only use gateway_icmp for monitoring 
3. Navigate to Network > Routes to manage the external_default_gateway 
4. Change the resource to use pool and select the pool created 
5. Now load balancing between the interfaces should be enabled. However, note that the load 
balancing does not happen between the outside network gateways and the traffic returns 
from the active HSRP interface. What is the problem with this? 
SSL offloading 
1. Navigate to System > File Management > SSL Certificate List and import the certificate and 
key used earlier 
2. The key and certificate are imported separately. Choose import type depending on which 
you are importing 
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3. A Client SSL Profile needs to be created. Start by navigating to Local Traffic > Profiles > 
SSL > Client 
4. Create a new profile and add the certificate to the Certificate Key Chain 
5. Select the correct certificate, key and chain 
6. Leave everything else to their default values and save the profile 
 
 
 
7. Create a new HTTPS virtual server 
8. This time select the HTTPS service port 
9. Select the SSL Profile (Client) created earlier 
10. Everything else is identical to the HTTP virtual server 
11. SSL offloading should be active and can be tested by accessing the virtual server address 
using a secure connection e.g. https://192.168.101.111 
12. Next the HTTP traffic needs to redirected to HTTPS using a policy. Start by navigating to 
Local Traffic > Policies > Policy List 
13. Create a policy that executes the first matching rule 
14. After creating the policy, add a new rule to the policy 
15. Match all traffic 
16. Configure the task 
 
Do the following when the traffic is matched: 
Redirect to location: tcl:https://[getfield [HTTP::host] ":" 1][HTTP::uri] 
 
17. Save and publish the policy 
18. Navigate to HTTP virtual server Resources tab 
19. Add the policy under Policies 
20. Check that the policy redirects the HTTP traffic to HTTPS 
 
Mitigating denial of service attacks 
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1. Use slowhttptest on the Attacker client to launch a slowloris denial of service attack on the 
virtual server 
 
slowhttpstest -c 10000 -H -i 5 -r 50 -t GET -u https://192.168.101.111 
 
2. Test accessing the HTTP service using the User client. The service should be inaccessible 
soon after the attack begins 
3. You can exit the attack tool using CTRL + C 
4. Effects of a slowloris attack can be mitigated using an iRule 
5. To create a new iRule, navigate to Local Traffic > iRules > iRule List 
6. Add the following iRule provided by F5 to mitigate slowloris attacks 
 
when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { 
set rtimer 0 
after 1000 { 
if { not $rtimer} { 
drop 
} 
} 
} 
when HTTP_REQUEST { 
set rtimer 1 
} 
 
7. After saving the iRule it needs to be activated on the virtual server on the Resources tab 
8. Activate the iRule on both virtual servers 
9. Use the attack earlier to again. Looking at the slowhttptest statistics, do you see a 
difference? 
10. Try to access the service again, and it should be accessible. 
11. Note that if you launch a bigger attack, the switches and routers do not have enough 
resources to cope with it. This should not happen in a real environment since the attack 
does not generate much traffic. 
12. Now that SSL is enabled the virtual server is vulnerable to SSL renegotiation attack 
13. Disable the slowloris iRule to be able to manually test for the vulnerability 
14. Use the following command on the User machine 
 
openssl s_client -connect www.dclab.fi:443 
 
15. Type R and press enter to renegotiate the connection. You can do it five times before you 
need to reconnect. Please reconnect and try once more. You should be able to renegotiate 
as before, which means that it can be done indefinitely 
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16. Renegotiation takes up 10 times the resources from the server compared with the client. If 
you can renegotiate the handshake indefinitely, it is a serious vulnerability to denial-of-
service attack. Using an automated attack tool, it is possible to take up a lot of resources 
17. It possible to limit this by using the following iRule also provided by F5 
 
when RULE_INIT { 
 set static::maxquery 5 
 set static::mseconds 60000 
} 
when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { 
 set ssl_hs_reqs 0 
} 
when CLIENTSSL_HANDSHAKE { 
 incr ssl_hs_reqs 
 after $static::mseconds { if {$ssl_hs_reqs > 0} {incr ssl_hs_reqs -1} } 
 if { $ssl_hs_reqs > $static::maxquery } { 
  after 5000 
  log "Handshake attack detected, drop-ping 
[IP::client_addr]:[TCP::client_port]" 
  drop 
 } 
} 
 
18. Activate the iRule on the HTTPS server and try to renegotiate the connection again 
19. It should be possible to renegotiate the connection only five times and after this the 
connection hangs 
20. You should not be able to connect for a minute after this 
21. Look at the logs on the ADC. There should be messages saying that an attack was 
detected 
